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Walker: Insurance

INSURANCE
WESLEY M. WALKER*

Of the four cases decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals
and the eight cases decided by the Supreme Court of South
Carolina, the problems on a whole were not novel ones. However, one of the more unique problems was involved in the
case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
v. Cooper' and was created as a result of the somewhat recent
motor vehicle financial responsibility law enacted in South
Carolina.
In this case action was brought by a wife to recover from
the insurance company the amount of a judgment which she
had recovered against her husband for injuries suffered by
her as a result of an accident to his automobile while she
was riding with him as a guest. The company denied liability under the husband's policy because the policy under
"Exclusions" expressly provided that it should not cover
any obligation of the insured to pay damages to any member
of his family residing in the same household with him because
of bodily injury caused by accident and arising out of the use
of the automobile. The policy in question provided that the
insurance afforded by the policy for bodily injury liability
should comply with the provisions of the motor vehicle financial responsibility law of any state which would be applicable.
The Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of South Carolina 2 provides that the liability of the insurance carrier under
a motor vehicle liability policy required by the statute shall
become absolute whenever injury or damage covered by the
policy occurs. The Circuit Court of Appeals, however, in
reversing judgment for the wife by the District Court, held
that the statute in South Carolina was not applicable in that
there is no requirement that all owners and operators of
motor cars carry liability insurance and the statute does not
come into play until the owner or operator has been involved
in an accident. The policy here was taken out voluntarily
*Member of law firm of Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Greenville, S. C.
1. 233 F. 2d 500 (4th Cir. 1956).
2. Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952 Section 46-750.26 (1).
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prior to the accident and not under compulsion of the South
Carolina Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act.
FraudulentBreach of Contract
Contrary to previous years there was only one case involving the breach of contract. This was the case of Taylor
v. United States Casualty Company,3 which was an action
for fraudulent breach of contract of automobile liability insurance covering assigned risk. The court held that the
failure of insured's agent to remit to insurer premium paid
by insured did not constitute a fraudulent breach of contract
but only constituted negligence, nor could the resulting cancellation of the policy be construed as constituting a fraudulent act. Insured could only, therefore, recover for breach of
contract and not punitive damages, and the jury could consider as an element of damage plaintiff's inability to comply
with the motor vehicle safety responsibility law.
Comprehensive Crime Policy
American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Thomas & Hozard of Spartanburg,South Carolina4 was an action by insured
against insurer under comprehensive crime policy for inventory loss which insured alleged it sustained through fraud or
dishonesty of insured's employees. The policy contained a
record keeping provision - that as a condition precedent
to recovery under said policy the insured was to keep verifiable records of all property covered by this policy. Insured
admitted that inventory of each year was kept twelve months
and destroyed and that certain inventory listings which were
necessary to determine what items of inventory might be
missing and the value thereof had been destroyed. The Court
determined that the failure on the part of the insured to keep
such books and records as would accurately reflect the amount
of loss which it claimed deprived the insurance company completely of its protection against fraudulent claims on the
part of the insured, that being manifestly the purpose of the
record keeping provision of the policy and it being the settled
law of South Carolina that record keeping provisions of a
policy are valid and that substantial compliance by the inoured is required.
3. 229 S. C. 230, 92 S. E. 2d 647 (1956).
4. 233 F. 2d 215 (4th Cir. 1956).
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Cooperationof Insured
The Circuit Court of Appeals held in the case of Pennsylvania Threshermen and Farmer'sMutual Casualty Insurance
Company v. Owens5 that whether or not the insured has met
his obligation to cooperate as provided by the terms of the
policy is for determination of the trier of facts with the
insurer carrying the burden or proving the alleged noncooperation of the assured - that the mere showing that insured has disappeared by time of trial of the action without
showing any circumstances affording a hint to explain his
disappearance is insufficient to show lack of cooperation
which would relieve insurer of liability under the policy.
The insured in this instance had given a statement to the
insurer which was held by the trial judge to occupy the same
position as any other testimony offered by plaintiff.
Disability Under Policy
The Court held in the case of Wardlaw v. Woodmen of The
World Life Insurance Society6 that the evidence showed that
the insured became disabled during the time the policy was
in force and it was immaterial whether premiums were paid
during a period thereafter; that the fact that no proof of
disability was filed is an affirmative defense and must be
pleaded.
Excess Insurer
In the case of South CarolinaElectric & Gas Company v.
Aetna Life Insurance Company,7 the plaintiff insured had an
excess machinery policy with a company paying for loss in

excess of $10,000. Insured suffered damage to machinery
and executed a loan receipt to the excess insurer wherein
it was stated that from any recovery on fire policies and
after payment of attorney fees and expenses of litigation,
the excess insurer would be reimbursed for the amount it
paid. Insured thereupon brought action against the insurer
under the fire policies and such insurer moved for production
of certain records by insured and an order requiring the excess
insurer to be substituted as plaintiff in the action. The
Court held that the right of action was vested in the insured
alone and the excess insurer was not a necessary party at all
5. 238 F. 2d 549 (4th Cir. 1956).
6. 230 S. C. 234, 95 S. E. 2d 253 (1956).
7. 230 S. C. 340, 95 S. E. 2d 596 (1956).
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and its joinder as a proper party was within the discretionary
power of the Court. Further, it was stated that, assuming
that the coverages here were mutually exclusive, it could not
be adjudged as a matter of law, as contended by defendant,
that the effect of payment by the excess insurer to insured was
to relieve the defendant from liability under their policies.
Change of Beneficiary
In the case of Swygert v. DurhamLife Insurance Companys
the plaintiff was named as beneficiary under a policy of insurance in 1942 wherein the right was reserved to the insured to change the beneficiary. Plaintiff, to whom the insured was at one time engaged, kept the policy although insured paid the premiums. Six years later, insured applied for
a new certificate of insurance in which he stated that the
policy as originally issued was lost or destroyed and agreed
that should the original policy be found the certificate of
insurance would be null and void and that he would immediately return the certificate of insurance to the company for
cancellation. A new certificate was issued and subsequently,
pursuant to application of the insured, a change of beneficiary
from plaintiff to insured's wife was effected and such change
was endorsed on the back of the certificate. The Court held
that insured had effected a valid change in beneficiary even
though insured represented that the original policy had been
lost or destroyed when he actually knew of its location that the beneficiary has no right to raise objections to the
failure to produce the policy for endorsement of the change
of beneficiary thereon and that the provision in the policy
requiring production of the policy for such purpose is for
the benefit of the insurer and can be waived by it as was the
case in this action.
Procedure
Hodge v. Reserve Life Insurance Company,9 was an action
by plaintiff seeking damages against defendant, a foreign
corporation, for alleged fraud and deceit in the solicitation
for the sale to plaintiff of policies of surgical and hospital
insurance. The action was commenced in the Court of Com-

mon Pleas for Darlington County and upon the defendant
moving for an order changing the place of trial upon the
8. 229 S. C. 199, 92 S. E. 2d 478 (1956).

9. 229 S. C. 326, 92 S. E. 2d 849 (1956).
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grounds that this was an action ex delicto and it had no
agent and maintained no office in Darlington County, the
lower court denied such motion. Such decision was based
on the provisions of Section 10-306 of the Code of Laws of
South Carolina, 1952,10 and concluded that while the action
was in tort for fraud and deceit, the alleged damages arose
out of claimed misrepresentations by defendant's agent as
to coverage under the policies, which damages occurred in
Darlington County and the alleged damages were within the
statutory term "loss." On appeal, this order was reversed and
the case remanded for entry of order transferring it to a
county where defendant maintained an office and agent, the
Court stating:
We think that the phrase, 'where the loss occurs,' contemplates loss from a casualty insured against under
the terms of the policy.
It was held in the case of Blackwell v. United Insurance
Company of America," that in the absence of the contract
documents - the policy - the verity of the allegations of the
answer could not be determined and it was, therefore, error
to grant the motion of plaintiff to strike the answer as sham
and frivolous and to order judgment thereupon for plaintiff.

CertainProvisionsof Policies
The Court held that the company acted within its right in
refusing to accept the renewal premium and thus extend the
term of the policy in the case of Chastain v. United Insurance
Company.12 The policy contained a clause stating that the
acceptance of any renewal premium should be optional with
the company and the Court found no ambiguity in this provision of the contract and the rule of strict construction
against the insurer would not apply here.
The case of Jersey Insurance Company of New York v.
Heffron,'3 involved an appeal by the defendant insurance
company from a judgment for the plaintiff in the United
States District Court for damages growing out of an alleged
explosion.
10. "All suits brought against any and all fire, life or other insurance

companies in this state may be brought in the county where the loss
occurs.... "

11. 229 S. C. 296, 92 S. E. 2d 702 (1956).
12. 230 S. C. 465, 96 S. E. 2d 464 (1957).
13. 242 F. 2d 136 (4th Cir. 1957).
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The facts were quite interesting. Plaintiff's property was
a two story frame dwelling on Queen Street in Charleston.
Adjoining it was a two-story brick building formerly used
as a garage for the post office. There was a space of approximately ten and one-half feet between the east wall of
the old post office garage and plaintiff's house.
On December 4, 1951, the east and west walls of the garage
fell or were blown out so that the west wall went to the west
and the east wall went to the east. The north and south walls
were substantially unaffected. There was considerable noise
accompanying the happening described as "like a bomb exploding", etc. Large pieces of mortar from the garage wall were
propelled by the force of the occurrence to the roof of plaintiff's house which was higher than the garage wall.
Under those facts, Judge Wyche sitting without a jury held
that an explosion had occurred. The Court of Appeals affirmed saying:
In this case the facts do not compel the conclusion
reached by the Court as to the manner in which the
damage to Plaintiff's property occurred, but we cannot
say that the conclusion was without substantial basis.
While the Court of Appeals has broader powers in reviewing a District Judge's findings of -fact than in reviewing the findings of a jury (U. S. v. U. S. Gypsum
Company, 333 U. S. 364, 395), it will not disturb his
findings merely because it may doubt their correctness.
It is required that the Court of Appeals be satisfied that
the District Judge is clearly in error before it will set
his findings aside. Federal Rules Civ. Proc. 52 (a) 28
U. S. C.A.
The Court likewise decided adversely to defendant's contention that the word "rupture" as used in the policy connoted a gradual rather than a sudden happening.
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